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Abstract. This work analyses the performance of a Dynamic Spectrum
Access (DSA) network with secondary nodes to provide Internet services,
and studies the impact of malicious nodes and cooperative secondary
nodes on the performance of the network and spectrum utilization. The
work mathematically models the throughput, latency, and spectrum uti-
lization with varying numbers of malicious nodes, secondary nodes, miss
probabilities, and false alarm probabilities, and studies their effect on
performance of the network. The results point to rapid spectrum starva-
tion as the number of malicious nodes increase, as well as the negative
impact of too many secondary nodes crowding out available spectrum
with resultant degradation of throughput and latency.
Keywords: Spectrum utilization · Secondary node · Backhaul · Mali-
cious node · Throughput · Latency · Primary user.
1 Introduction
Estimates have confirmed availability of white spaces (unused licensed bands)
and similar observation of under-utilization of the allocated spectrum have been
reported by Spectrum Policy Task Force appointed by Federal Communication
Commission in the United States and others [1, 4]. Spectrum efficiency can be
increased significantly by giving opportunistic access of these frequency bands to
a group of potential users (unlicensed users) for whom the band has not officially
been allocated to use [4]. The users in these networks are expected to be oppor-
tunistic. The users refer to the nodes on the network. Therefore granting access
to such users in the spectrum may create room for malicious nodes (secondary
nodes which do not follow spectrum etiquette and cause harm to other spectrum
users). There is the need for all the opportunistic nodes within a specified lo-
cation to collaborate or cooperate to ensure fairness in the spectrum. Recently,
there has been much research in the areas of nodes collaboration or cooperation
and the effects of malicious nodes presence in the DSA-based (dynamic spectrum
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access based) networks [1–3, 5–10]. The rationale for the collaboration is to help
detect secondary nodes present in the network or to help report system abuse
to the decision centers to identify malicious nodes in the network.
Neighbour collaborative monitoring was demonstrated in [5] where nodes
monitor neighbours by measuring their RSSI (received signal strength indicator)
values to estimate the distance of the neighbour nodes, which effectively help to
detect sybil nodes. Sybil (replicated nodes produced by a secondary node) Nodes
Detection is a neighbour monitoring approach used to detect sybil attacks on
a network. It uses localization verification technique based on received signal
strength, which allows a node to verify the authenticity of another node by
estimating its future geographic location and comparing them to its evaluated
position. However, the sybil detection failed to prove the validity of the RSS
(received signal strength) in estimating the distance to determine the future
distance. It was observed in [5] that communication cost was too high which will
have a severe negative effect on the performance metrics (throughput and delay)
of the network.
Again, neighbour nodes discovery was proposed in [6]. This approach consid-
ers a single seed node (with all the parameters known) to locate other nodes by
broadcasting a message to all neighbour nodes within its range. The most distant
node from the seed node becomes the next seed node, using the above process,
all the nodes coordinates are estimated [6]. The proposed protocol seems promis-
ing, but it may unnecessarily increase network communication overhead when
implemented in the real world: which can be a major problem for opportunistic
networks that have limited channels to use for communication.
Moreover, the presence of malicious nodes in a DSA-based network was pro-
posed by Jin, Zito, et al. [8]. In their work, it was observed that the closer the
malicious nodes to the secondary node, the higher the values of miss and false
alarm probabilities obtained. The higher probabilities also affected the detection
of the presence of the primary user by the honest secondary node (the unlicensed
user in the spectrum that does not work against the spectrum etiquette).
Furthermore, Jonathan, PINIFOLO, et al. [11] considered interference of
neighbour nodes in the secondary devices that operate on UHF (Ultra high
frequency) band. It discovered that neighbour nodes within a distance range of
7km apart could have neighbour nodes interference in the UHF band. However,
it failed to consider neighbour monitoring in the cooperative network to know
the impact on the performance of the density of the secondary nodes in the
network.
The main contribution of this paper is three folds. Firstly, we model dy-
namic spectrum access network that uses neighbour monitoring in cooperative
secondary nodes and analyses how malicious nodes present in the network may
downgrade performance indicators such as throughput and delay and also affect
spectrum utilization. Secondly, It also assesses the impact on performance by
increasing the number of collaborative secondary nodes in backhaul nodes of
a DSA-based network. Thirdly, The study developed mathematical models to
measure throughput, latency and spectrum utilization taking into consideration
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all possible interferences. We demonstrate this work through simulations. The
paper is organized as follows; Section 1 considers introduction, Section 2 con-
siders general system model and the performance metrics, Section 3 results and
discussion and finally Section 4 conclusion and future work.
2 System Model
In our model, we positioned fixed secondary nodes (the unlicensed users within
the spectrum) connected to the fusion center. The secondary nodes are positioned
within a square area of (d ∗ d)km. The ith device, with position coordinates
Pi = (xi, yj) where, i = 1, 2, 3, ..., N and j = 1, 2, 3, ..., N the positions of n nodes
are assumed to be independent of each other. Each of the secondary nodes has
a transmission range R within the area. Primary user (license user within the
spectrum) is located at a minimum distance of
√
(x2i + y
2
i ), from the secondary
node. The fusion center is empowered with the responsibility of making spectrum
decisions for the secondary nodes. Secondary and malicious nodes sensed the
spectrum using energy detection. as shown in Figure 1. secondary nodes are also
embedded with spectrum analyzers to capture the received signal strength from
the neighbours, which is forwarded to the fusion center. We make the following
assumptions to perform the analysis.
Fig. 1: Network with TV white space devices as back haul controlled by FC
2.1 Assumptions
I There are N secondary nodes and M malicious nodes in the system.
II Each secondary node, shall communicate to the fusion center using control
channel.
III Secondary nodes are static and do not change position.
IV Secondary nodes are used as backhaul nodes to provide access network to
rural communities
V The primary user (transmitter) is at a minimum distance of
√
(x2q + y
2
q ),
where q = 1, 2, 3, ...,∞, Such that xq and yq are position coordinates of a
secondary node
VI The primary user transmits at the power of Pt, the secondary node at Ps
and the malicious node at aPm
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VII The positions of the secondary nodes and the malicious nodes are uniformly
distributed in the square of a side length of (d)km. They are statistically
independent of each other.
VIII Malicious nodes are randomly distributed.
IX The received signal strength indicator values received by the fusion center
are normally distributed random variables with mean µ and variance σ2
X There is cooperation between the secondary nodes. Therefore a malicious
node attack is analyzed collaboratively.
XI Two access networks are connected to the backhaul network via access point
device.
XII The fusion center has Internet connectivity through a gateway node and
therefore provides access to broadband internet through the backhaul sec-
ondary nodes to the users
XIII Each secondary node has an adaptive modulation scheme which offers the
capability to increase the radios receiver sensitivity.
2.2 Performance metrics
We shall consider how malicious nodes affect throughput, latency and spectrum
utilization of the network shown in Figure 1. In computing the latency and the
Throughput we assume that the transmitter is fully able to utilize the entire
channel capacity. Also channel coefficient values are dependent on the transmis-
sion environment parameters such as, distance, antenna height, etc. But, The
channel coefficients are independent on the Bandwidth. Coefficients were derived
from the Hata propagation model.
Throughput is defined as the amount of data that can be transmitted through
a given channel or link per second.It is measured in bits per second (bps) Given
the bandwidth of the channel in the backhaul network as B. We arbitrary con-
sidered a bandwidth value of 100MHZ, this is because of the scenario of the
backhaul nodes we considered. We assume that there are m secondary nodes in
the network. The throughput can therefore be estimated as follows,
Throughput(TP ) = Blog2
(
|ht|Pt
|hint|Pint+pmiss
∑M
m=0 |hm|Pm+σ2
)
, (1)
where
ht = transmitter coefficient
Pt = transmitter power
hint = interference coefficient
Pint = interference power
hm = malicious node interference coefficient
Pm = malicious node power
pmiss = miss detection probability
σ = additive white Gaussian noise
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Also, including the factor of the secondary nodes collaborating in the net-
work, throughput will be given by:
Throughput(TP ) = Blog2
(
|ht|Pt
|hint|Pint+pmiss
∑M
m=0 |hm|Pm+
∑S
S=0 |hs|Ps+σ2
)
, (2)
where
hs = secondary node coefficient
Ps = secondary node power
σ = additive white Gaussian noise
Latency is the time it takes for data transmitted by a sender to reach the
intended receiver (destination). Considering Figure 1, when user 1 sends message
to user 4 on the other network with data size of (D)Mbps.
Latency = D
[
1
TP1
+
1
TP2
+
1
TP3
+ ...+
1
TPq
]
, (3)
where,
TPq = Throughput for the link between the transmitter and the receiver, ∀q, q =
1, 2, 3, 4, ..., n. The latency is the sum of all the individual links delay because, the
backhual nodes operate mesh routing protocol which may route packet through
any of the links available and optimal at all times. We therefore assumed that
packets travel through all the q links
Spectrum utilization in simple terms is the usage of the spectrum. Both the
secondary and malicious nodes sense the spectrum with a given probability of
detection, miss-detection (Miss detection probability is when the transmission
is made by the primary transmitter, but the secondary node assumes the trans-
mission is made by the malicious node [8]) or false alarm (is when the actual
transmission is made by the malicious node but the secondary node assumes the
transmission is from the primary transmitter [8]) probabilities.
Let N be the set of secondary nodes that provide backhaul to the access
point.
N = {n1, n2, n1, ..., nα} (4)
In addition, let C be the set of channels that can be used by the backhaul
secondary nodes:
C =

c1n1 c
2
n1 , ..., c
β
n1
c1n2 c
2
n2 , ...., c
β
n2
. . .
. . .
. . .
c1nα c
2
nα , ..., c
β
nα

, (5)
where cynx ; nx ∈ N, y ∈ β is the yth channel of secondary backhaul node nx.
Furthermore, let pfa(c
y
nx) be the false alarm probability of y in nx. The spectrum
utilization, S1 derived as,
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S1 =
∑α
x=1
∑β
y=1(1− pfa(cynx))B(cynx)∑α
x=1
∑β
y=1B(c
y
nx)
(6)
Considering presence of malicious node in spectrum utilization, let γnx be the
set of malicious nodes around secondary node in the backhaul nx
γnx = {γ1nx , γ2nx , ..., γΦnx} (7)
Hence, with the malicious nodes present, spectrum utilization S2 is given by
(8)
S2 =
∑α
x=1
∑β
y=1(1−pfa(cynx ))B(cynx )−|γnx |pfa(cynx )B(γnx )∑α
x=1
∑β
y=1 B(c
y
nx )
(8)
3 Results and discussions
The values of the numerical parameters we considered for our simulation test are
listed in Table 1. Also, miss detection and false alarm probability values were
adopted from Jin, Zuo et al. [8]. Statistically, we validated our simulation results
by running about thirty different simulations tests by randomly varying various
parameters within fixed ranges. The results presented by all the tests did not
show any significant variation.
In Figure 2, the throughput was obtained by varying miss probability values.
Again, in Figure 3 throughput depended on the variation in the number of
malicious nodes present in the network. Also, In both Figures 4 and 5, latency
and spectrum utilization depended on the number of malicious nodes found in
the network. Figure 6 we varied the number of secondary node nodes and kept
some malicious nodes constant and plotted against the simulated throughput
values obtained. And, in Figure 7 we simulated the latency as we kept fixed the
number of malicious nodes and varied the number of secondary nodes in the
backhaul and lastly, Figure 8 presents throughput against number of malicious
nodes prsent in the network. We again simulated the network throughput by
varying the number of secondary nodes with fixed number of secondary nodes
in the backhaul nodes.
Figure 2 measures channel throughput against miss detection probabilities.
Looking closely at the simulation results it shows that when miss detection rate
was zero, two things were considered, that is, the malicious nodes may be present
but do not cause any miss detection attacks, or there may be no malicious node
found in the network. The throughput obtained by the simulation at zero miss
detection rate was 0.136Mbps.Also, at miss detection probability rate of 0.01,
the throughput dropped to 0.082Mbps which represents a percentage decrease
of about 39% from when there was zero recording of miss detection, which shows
that at 99% detection the maximum quality of service can not be guaranteed.
The same decrease trend was observed in the throughput with the number of
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Fig. 3: Throughput versus number of ma-
licious nodes present around the backhaul
secondary nodes
Fig. 4: Latency versus number of mali-
cious nodes present around the backhaul
secondary nodes
Fig. 5: Utilization versus number of mali-
cious nodes around the backhaul secondary
nodes
Fig. 6: Throughput versus density of sec-
ondary nodes around the backhaul sec-
ondary nodes
Fig. 7: Latency versus density of secondary
nodes around the backhaul secondary nodes
Fig. 8: Throughput versus number of ma-
licious nodes present around the backhaul
nodes
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Fig. 2: Throughput versus miss detection
rate
parameter value
secondary power (35-41)dBm
malicious power (33-38)dBm
frequency (470-790)MHz
nodes density 1 to 10
interference power (4-11)dBm
coefficient values 0.1 t0 2
Bandwidth 100 MHz
Data Size 100MB
Table 1: simulation parameters
malicious nodes of 3, 5 and 10 with varying miss detection rates. But there was
a significant difference in the drop in throughput when the number of malicious
nodes increases as shown in Figure 2. Inversely, from Figure 2 the result indicates
that increased in miss detection probability directly decreased the value of the
throughput.
In Figure 3 throughput was also found to decrease with the increase in the
number of malicious nodes in the network with constant miss detection rate.
But the higher the miss detection probability value, the greater the drop in
throughput as shown in Figure 3. The miss detection probability of 0.1 recorded
much decrease in throughput as compared to miss probability value of 0.01 as
shown in Figure 3.
We also considered an end-to-end effect of latency by the presence of ma-
licious nodes on the network. End-to-end here refers to a user on a different
network connected to our backhaul network, which is supposed to serve one
community and another user on a different network connected to our backhaul
network serving another community. We assume that user 1 on the network
connected to secondary node say D sends a message to user 4 on the network
connected to secondary node say C. The simulation result shows that when there
was no malicious node present in the network, the delay recorded was 0.30ns but
once malicious nodes were introduced into the network, the latency increased as
the number of malicious nodes also increased as shown in Figure 4.
We further modeled and simulated spectrum utilization using different false
alarm probability rate on various channels and using four fixed secondary nodes
as backhaul nodes. We kept the false alarm probabilities constant for each chan-
nel and varied the number of malicious nodes. It was observed that it is not
possible for the spectrum to hold more than three malicious nodes at a time
if the quality of service is to be guaranteed for the users on the network, as
indicated in Figure 5.
Moreover, we also varied the density of the secondary nodes in the network
and kept the malicious nodes and the miss probability of 0.1 constant at all
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cases. We observed variations in throughput and latency, as shown in Figures 6
and 7 respectfully. Considering Figure 6 it could be deduced that increased in
the number of cooperative secondary nodes reduced the throughput significantly
from one secondary node present to two secondary nodes present. But, as the
number of cooperative secondary nodes increased the variation in the throughput
as against fixed number of malicious nodes present did not significantly affect
the throughput(from two to ten cooperative secondary node). However, there
was a significant increase in the latency as data traveled from one network to
another network. For fixed ten malicious nodes as against no malicious node
present among the backhaul nodes (the cooperative secondary nodes) recorded
high increase. We also inferred that as the cooperative sensing nodes increase,
malicious nodes combined effect on latency also reduced, as demonstrated in
Figure 7.
Again, Figure 8 shows that when cooperative nodes of a size of 2, 3 or 5
secondary nodes considerably work better than 10 cooperative nodes, which
indicates when the cooperative or collaborative nodes increase it affects the
throughput of the network. We inferred that when the number of cooperative
nodes increased, it introduced a lot of interference signals to the network. So,
therefore, the lower the cooperative nodes, the lesser the network interference.
Also, the lower the number of cooperative nodes are, the greater the performance
(throughput) of the network. But the performance deteriorated when the number
of cooperative nodes grew up to a size of 10 as shown in figure 8.
Our system model above is closest to the model adopted by Jin, Zituo, et
al. [8], however, it failed to measure the performance metrics and utilization
of the network. Again, their model considered only one secondary node with
multiple malicious nodes. Also, their model was used to detect primary user
emulation attack. However, In our model, we considered various numbers of
secondary nodes as against multiple numbers of malicious nodes. Also, we varied
the distances from all the secondary nodes to the primary transmitter based on
their coordinate points (X and Y ). Again, our work confirmed the research
findings of Jonathan, PINIFOLO, et al. [11], that neighbour nodes within a
distance range of 7km produces interference to the neighbour nodes. However,
we further showed that secondary nodes might be able to collaborate well by
monitoring each node if malicious nodes are not existing in the network.
4 Conclusion
In conclusion, we have demonstrated through simulations that, the presence of
malicious nodes in dynamic spectrum access networks downgrades the perfor-
mance of the network. We further showed that densely collaborated nodes in
DSA network might affect the performance of the network, as interferences are
introduced into the spectrum. Again, we demonstrated that, if malicious users
are absent in the DSA network, neighbour monitoring collaborative network may
be feasible to implement with fewer legitimate secondary nodes at a time. The
malicious nodes present can significantly affect the authorized users, as the spec-
trum may occasionally appear to be fully utilized. The major limitation of this
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study is that, the interference factors used in the performance and the utilization
models may not be realistic in real world application. In future, we shall under-
take real world measurements to get actual impact of the malicious nodes on
the performance of a DSA-based network. Again, we shall consider developing
detection algorithm to identify the malicious nodes to reduce their impact on
the performance of DSA-based collaborative networks.
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